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Abstract
We demonstrate that policies aimed at reducing frictional unemployment may lead
to the opposite results. In a labor market with long-term wage contracts and moral
hazard, any such policy reduces employees’ opportunity costs of staying on a job.
As employees are less worried about losing their job, a smaller share of employees is
willing to exert effort, leading to a lower average productivity. Consequently, firms
create fewer vacancies, resulting in lower employment and decreased welfare.
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1 Introduction
Mechanisms that target reduction of out-of-pocket expenses (or increase of disposable in-
come) of job seekers but have no effect on the job matching technology are popular in
many countries and appear in various forms.1 The costs associated with active job search
are closely linked to job market participation, as they deter potential workers from active
search, increase unemployment spells, and thus reduce welfare (Pries and Rogerson, 2009).
Accordingly, mechanisms designed to mitigate these costs are typically seen as means to
reduce frictions and to provide better incentives for participation in the job market (Grubb,
2001), or for avoiding unsuitable jobs, thus increasing the job matching efficiency (Chetty,
2008). The introduction of the UK Jobseeker’s Allowance in 1996, for example, was to some
extent aimed at increasing search intensity among the unemployed and, consequently, the
flow into employment (Rayner et al., 2000). However, although the search intensity of job
seekers increased as a result, this could be attributed to weeding out of low-intensity job
seekers, who opt out of the job market (Manning, 2009). Therefore, the social implications
of benefit programs for job seekers appear to be non-trivial.
We demonstrate that, counterintuitively, jobseeker benefits and policies that target re-
duction of job search costs may have welfare damaging effect and, moreover, may lead to
a collapse of the labor market if taken to the extreme.2 Our model is applicable to labor
markets with long-term wage contracts where an employee’s performance is observed after
a certain period of time—as in public administration jobs, academic and medical jobs, and
many types of professional employment. Our results suggest that policy makers should take
into consideration the specific characteristics of the targeted labor market in determination of
optimal jobseeker benefits. Otherwise, a careless use of jobseeker or unemployment benefits
can be a welfare-harmful misspending of the taxpayer money.
Consider the situation where an employer wants to fill a qualified job position. It is not
observable at the stage of job interviews whether a potential employee would be willing to
exert enough effort to cope with assigned tasks. Furthermore, an employee’s productivity
becomes observable only after a certain period of time. Thus, in the initial period of em-
ployment, an employee can potentially work hard to demonstrate her abilities and to obtain
permanent employment, or, alternatively, she can shirk and, when her real productivity
1Prominent examples are tax deductibility for job search expenses in the US (IRS Publication 529, 2011,
p. 5; see also Garrison and Cummings, 2010), and unemployment benefit programs with provisions that an
individual maintains the status of “job seeker” such as Jobseeker’s Allowance (UK), Newstart Allowance
(Australia), Employment Insurance (Canada), and the Unemployment Benefit (New Zealand), to name a
few.
2This is without taking into account the cost of running such schemes which is an additional toll on the
social welfare.
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becomes known, separate and search for a new vacancy at another firm.
In the described situation, job search costs play a crucial role. The higher the costs of
searching for a new job, the weaker the incentives an employee has to “cheat” in the initial
period of employment and move on to another employer. Therefore, a decrease in the job
search costs could be welfare damaging, since fewer employees would be willing to exert effort
and to continue being employed by the same firm, and more individuals would be searching
for a job. This, in turn, reduces firms’ benefits of opening a vacancy. Eventually, when these
benefits drop below the cost of maintaining a vacancy, firms refrain from offering vacancies,
and the labor market collapses.
Our paper contributes to the literature concerned with the relationship between unem-
ployment and incentives. A substantial part of the literature focuses on the adverse effects of
unemployment benefits on job search effort (Holmlund, 1998; Pissarides, 2000; Fredriksson
and Holmlund, 2006). Unemployment benefits provide an income insurance for risk-averse
workers on the one hand, but reduce incentives for job search (thus leading to higher unem-
ployment rates) on the other hand.3 A solution for the incentive problem that the existing
literature largely supports is conditioning unemployment benefits on active job search, in
other words, restricting the benefits to individuals who seek employment, and only for a
limited time after losing the previous job (e.g., Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006). There
remain adverse effects of unemployment insurance on the intensity of search, as unemployed
workers reduce the effort invested in finding vacancies (Baily, 1978; Shavell and Weiss, 1979).
In comparison, in our model, unemployment benefits may be welfare damaging even when
only job seekers are targeted and search intensity is fixed. An increase in the job seekers’
utility undermines incentives for workers to exert on-the-job effort and makes individuals
more eager to quit one job and seek another.
Our paper is also closely related to the efficiency wage literature. Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) suggested involuntarily unemployment as an incentive device. In their model, firms
strategically reduce the number of vacancies, so that some workers remain involuntarily
unemployed, so the threat of being laid off motivates employed workers to exert effort. The
main insight of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is that “Imperfect monitoring [of workers’ on-the-
job effort] necessitates unemployment.” In contrast, in our model involuntary unemployment
is not a necessity. In fact, all unemployment is voluntary in equilibrium, as any unemployed
worker can always secure a position with certainty. Our model can be viewed as a simplified
3Under certain assumptions an increase in unemployment benefits can mitigate, rather than aggravate, the
incentive problem, by promoting flow into (and creation of) high-productivity jobs (Acemoglu and Shimer,
2000) or through increasing the equilibrium performance-based component of the wage contracts (Demougin
and Helm, 2011).
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environment revealing the distinct role of job search costs.4 Thus, job search costs play a
complementary role to the utility loss of being unemployed. In this sense, we go further than
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) in exploring policy implications with regard to job search costs, an
issue that has not been raised in previous research. Furthermore, by considering participation
choices of heterogeneous workers, we can study the effects of search costs as a discipline
mechanism on a labor market that allows for simultaneous productive participation, non-
productive participation, and non-participation in equilibrium.5
2 Model
We consider a discrete-time labor market populated by a unit mass of heterogeneous in-
dividuals and a large set of homogeneous firms that create job positions. Individuals and
firms are risk neutral, infinitely lived and maximize their total lifetime utility with discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Each individual is characterized by her cost of effort c ∈ R+, which is private informa-
tion. At the beginning of every period, each individual can be in one of two states, employed
or unemployed.6 Each unemployed individual decides whether to participate in the labor
market or to stay out. An individual who stays out (called inactive) receives unemploy-
ment income u0 ≥ 0 in that period. An individual who searches for a job incurs some
matching cost and may receive some form of jobseeker’s benefits. The net expenses of an
individual for finding a job match will be denoted by s and referred to as the search cost.7
This cost is sunk and cannot be recovered. The matching technology is given by matching
function m(x, y) = min{x, y},8 where x and y represent the masses of participating individ-
uals and firms, respectively. Thus, the probability that a job seeker finds a match is given
by min{y/x, 1}.
At the beginning of every period, each firm has a single job position that can be either
filled or vacant. A firm that has a vacancy and is actively searching to fill it incurs a fee sF
in each period, until the vacancy is filled or withdrawn. To make a distinction from the
4This role remains qualitatively unchanged when incorporating matching friction and involuntary unem-
ployment, as we discuss in Section 2 below.
5Other related papers are Guerrieri (2008) and Matouschek et al. (2009). Guerrieri (2008) is concerned
about inefficiencies in a dynamic search model where workers’ disutility from labor is subject to random
shocks; Matouschek et al. (2009) study the effect of the separation cost on the willingness of firms and
employees to invest into continuation of the relationship after an exogenous shock.
6Here unemployed has its literal meaning of not being employed. This term does not make a distinction
between jobless individuals who are looking for a job and who are not.
7The search cost is exogenous and it does not include any foregone wages while being unemployed.
8This assumption is made for clarity of exposition, it is not crucial for the results (as discussed at the
end of this section).
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individuals’ job search cost, we shall refer to sF as the advertising cost. Because maintaining
a vacancy is costly, the total mass of vacant job positions will be endogenously determined
(the firms will create jobs so long as the cost of maintaining a vacancy does not exceed the
expected benefit).
After an individual has been matched with a firm, she becomes an employee. In every
period of employment, the employee is paid a constant wage w that divides the expected
surplus from the job match between the individual and the firm in a fixed proportion. The
share of the employee is β.9 At the end of the period, with exogenous probability 1−α (job
destruction rate) the employee quits the job and returns to the market.
Let us now introduce a moral hazard aspect to our story. In each period, an employee
decides either to exert effort or to shirk. High effort results in high revenue pi for the
firm, pi > u0; low effort results in low revenue for the firm, normalized to zero. We assume
that the wage is a binding contract, so the firm has to pay the same wage irrespective of
productivity. However, the firm can motivate its employee to exert high effort by deciding
whether to keep her on the job or to fire her on the basis of her past performance. The history
of an employee’s performance that preceded employment in the current firm is not observable
and cannot be conditioned upon. An employee that lost her job becomes unemployed and
immediately, before the beginning of the next period, makes a decision whether to participate
in the labor market or to stay out, and so on.
We focus on stationary Bayesian Nash equilibria in steady state only.10 In addition, we
make the following assumptions on the distribution of individuals’ types (costs of high effort).
Denote by F the cumulative distribution function of individuals’ types. Assume that F is
differentiable, and denote by f its density. Further, assume that F first order stochastically
dominates the uniform distribution on domain [0, αδβ(pi − u0)]. Roughly speaking, this
assumption rules out the case that individuals with relatively high cost of effort (those
who prefer to shirk when employed) are so small a minority that their participation can be
accommodated in equilibrium, because the average productivity is high enough. The effect
of this assumption on the results is discussed in Remark 1 (Section 4.3).
Discussion of assumptions. Our model is deliberately simple and stylized, yet it delivers
a robust insight. There are, however, two key assumptions that drive the results. First, we
assume that individuals have no reputation, as a firm cannot observe an employee’s history
prior to employment at that firm. In practice, reputation often plays an important role in
9The bargaining approach to wage determination is very common in the search literature (see, e.g.,
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (2000) for justification and discussions.)
10We do not restrict strategies of the market participants to stationary ones—we consider equilibria where
deviations to nonstationary strategies are not beneficial.
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labor markets, imposing an additional cost on job search for individuals who have shirked in
the past. Yet, so long as there is a fair degree of non-transparency of employment histories
(so that the cost imposed by bad reputation is not too high), our results remain qualitatively
unchanged.
Second, we assume that an employee’s compensation cannot be conditioned on output.
This assumption holds in many industries where salaries and employment contracts are nego-
tiated between employers and employee’s unions. If deferred compensation were possible, as
in Moen and Rosén (2011) and Tsuyuhara (2016), it would solve the moral hazard problem,
so the issue that we address in this paper would not arise.In fact, what really matters for our
results is (i) the initial-period wage, and (ii) the present value of all subsequent wages net of
the costs of effort. If the initial-period wage is lower than wages in the subsequent periods,
our results are mitigated but qualitatively remain intact, as long as the initial period wage
is greater than the search cost.11
There are also two stylized assumptions that can be easily relaxed. The assumption
that a firm perfectly observes its employee’s effort simplifies a sizable part of the analysis,
but it is not necessary for the results. In fact, imperfect observability of effort would only
aggravate the moral hazard problem, making our argument even stronger. The assumption
that the matching function is m(x, y) = min{x, y}, so job seekers are instantly matched to
available vacancies, is also made for expositional purposes. Allowing for more general match-
ing functions mitigates the moral hazard problem, since it creates congestion externalities,
i.e., job search is increasingly more expensive as the pool of unemployed individuals grows
(Pissarides, 2000). However, it cannot eliminate the problem completely, as the congestion
externality is a second-order effect. The implied increase in the search length will partially
offset the effect of decreases in search costs, but will not reverse it. Thus, the role of the
exogenous search cost will remain qualitatively unchanged.
3 Results
To start with, consider a conventional performance-pay model, where a firm can decide,
conditional on the recent performance of its employee, whether to pay the wage and keep
the employee on the job or to fire the employee without pay. This is a model without moral
hazard, as low performance is observable and punishable. In this benchmark model, reducing
job search costs is always beneficial as it diminishes the job search friction.
11Assuming that there is a sufficient mass of individuals with high cost of effort who prefer to shirk even
if the differential between the initial and subsequent wages is large.
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Proposition 1. In the model with no moral hazard, a reduction of the job search cost is
welfare improving.
See Appendix A.1 for details.
We now consider the model with moral hazard. In this model the wage must be paid to
an employee irrespective of her performance, but the firm can motivate its employee to exert
high effort by deciding to keep her on the job or not after having observed the performance.
3.1 Interaction of a Firm and an Employee
Let us begin with describing the optimal employment strategy for firms.
Lemma 1. A firm’s optimal strategy is to lay off its employee if and only if the last-period
performance is low, irrespective of the previous history of her performance in that firm.
Proof. The described strategy maximizes the difference between the payoff of one who
always exerts high effort and the payoff of one who shirks in a single period, thus maximizing
the set of types of individuals who would choose to exert high effort in all periods.
Let us derive an employee’s equilibrium effort decision. By assumption, the employee’s
effort decision is stationary. Let us now demonstrate that an employee exerts high effort if
and only if her type (cost of effort) is below some threshold level which is increasing in s.
That is, as search cost s increases, more individuals are willing to exert effort. The intuition
behind the result is that a higher search cost makes the strategy of shirking and searching
for a new job in every period less attractive as compared to the strategy of exerting high
effort and staying on the job with some probability.
Lemma 2. An employee of type c ∈ R+ exerts high effort if and only if
c < αδs.
Proof. Let us compare the lifetime utilities UH(c) and UL of an active individual who
exerts, respectively, high and low effort whenever employed, starting from a period in which
she is unemployed. Note that in the period where she is employed, her lifetime utility is
simply UH(c) + s, as in a steady state the only difference between being employed and
unemployed is the job search cost. The former is given by
UH(c) = −s+ (w − c) + δ [α(UH(c) + s) + (1− α)UH(c)]
=
w − c− (1− αδ)s
1− δ . (1)
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The latter is given by
UL = −s+ w + δUL = w − s
1− δ , (2)
since by Lemma 1 the individual is being laid off after one period of employment and hence re-
enters the labor market and pays search cost s in every period. Note that UL is independent
of c, as this person never bears the cost of high effort. Thus, an employee of type c will exert
high effort if and only if UH(c) > UL,12 or
w − c− (1− αδ)s
1− δ >
w − s
1− δ ,
which is equivalent to c < αδs.
3.2 Labor Supply
Let us now analyze the equilibrium participation decision of individuals. Denote by c∗(s)
the threshold individual type who is indifferent between exerting high or low effort,
c∗(s) = αδs.
Lemma 3. Let w be a steady-state equilibrium wage and denote
w¯(c) =
u0 + s− (c∗(s)− c), if c < c∗(s),u0 + s, if c ≥ c∗(s).
An individual of type c will participate in the labor market if w exceeds threshold wage w¯(c),
she will be indifferent if w = w¯(c), and she will stay out otherwise.
Function w¯(c) represents the inverse labor supply curve. In other words, for a given
wage w < u0 + s, individuals of types below c = w¯−1(w) will participate. At w = u0 + s,
the labor supply is discontinuous and jumps up, and for w > u0 + s it includes all types,
since the individuals who shirk (with c ≥ c∗(s)) are now willing to participate too, and their
utility does not depend on their cost of effort.
Proof. Let us compare the lifetime utility of an individual from always participating and
always staying out. The utility of always staying out, U0, is given by
U0 = u0 + δU0 =
u0
1− δ . (3)
12As in the proof of Lemma 6, the tie is a zero probability event and thus can be ignored.
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For an individual with c < c∗(s), the utility of always participating, UH(c), is given by (1).
This individual participates if UH(c) > U0, or
w > u0 + c+ (1− αδ)s = u0 + s− (c∗(s)− c).
For an individual with c ≥ c∗(s), the utility of always participating, UL, is given by (2). This
individual participates if UL > U0, or w > u0 + s.
Putting together Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. Let w be a steady-state equilibrium wage. Then:
(a) if w < u0 + s, then every individual of type c < c∗(s) + w − u0 − s participates with
probability one and exerts high effort; every other individual stays out.13
(b) if w > u0 + s, then all individuals participate with probability one, and only individuals
of type c < c∗(s) exert high effort;
(c) if w = u0 + s, then every individual of type c < c∗(s) participates with probability one
and exerts high effort; every other individual is indifferent between participating or not,
and in the event of participating she exerts low effort.
3.3 Equilibrium
Let X and Y denote the masses of active individuals (that are searching or producing) and
active firms (that have a filled job or a vacancy), respectively. We are interested in equilibria
with positive participation where there are active participants of the labor market, X,Y > 0.
Note that there always exists an equilibrium with zero participation, since no labor market
activity (X = Y = 0) is a steady state.
Define
s =
β(pi − αδu0)sF
(1− β)pi + αδsF and s¯ =
β(pi − u0)
1− αδ .
We can now describe the equilibrium.
Theorem 1.
(A) There exists an equilibrium with positive participation if and only if s ≤ s < s¯.
(B) The equilibrium with positive participation is unique. If s ≥ β(pi−u0), then it coincides
with that in the benchmark model. If s ≤ β(pi − u0),14 then it is characterized by:
(i) the equilibrium wage is w = u0 + s;
13We ignore a measure zero of individuals who are indifferent.
14For s = β(pi − u0) both statements are true.
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(ii) every individual of type c < αδs participates with probability one and exerts high
effort; every individual of type c ≥ αδs participates with probability λ∗ and exerts low effort,15
where
λ∗ =
(1− α)F (αδs)
(1− αδ)(1− F (αδs)) ·
β(pi − u0)− s
βu0 + s
. (4)
The proof is deferred to the Appendix.
It is worthwhile to note a few features of the equilibrium described in Part B. First, if
the job search cost is sufficiently high, s ≥ β(pi − u0), then all individuals who exert low
effort when being employed prefer to stay out of the labor market. That is, all individuals
who participate are willing to exert high effort, and the equilibrium coincides with that in
the benchmark model.
Second, if s < β(pi − u0), then both groups of individuals, those who exert high effort
and those who shirk, are present on the market, λ∗ > 0. Full separation (only high effort
workers participate, case (a) in Corollary 1) is impossible, because in that case the expected
productivity is high, which drives the wage up according to the wage determination rule,
thus providing incentives for “shirkers” to participate as well.
In addition, in the case of s < β(pi − u0) the equilibrium wage w is equal to u0 + s,
so it is increasing in search cost s. This is because the wage must be kept low enough to
prevent individuals who shirk on the job from entering the market in their entire mass. If s
goes down, then the strategy of shirking and switching jobs in every period becomes more
attractive, so to counterbalance this effect the wage must go down as well.
Remark 1. The condition that F first order stochastically dominates the uniform distribu-
tion on domain [0, αδβ(pi−u0)] is sufficient to guarantee that pooling (all types of individuals
participate, case (b) in Corollary 1) cannot occur in equilibrium for any search cost level
above s. If this condition does not hold, then it may be the case that the relative mass of
the individuals who shirk is small enough, so even if the entire mass of shirking individuals
participates, the productivity is still high and the wage obtained by the wage determination
rule is still attractive for these individuals.
Under pooling equilibrium, the search cost effect due to moral hazard is less substantial,
because the mass of shirking individuals is small. Pooling equilibrium gives the lower bound
on welfare, while separating equilibrium of the benchmark model (where the moral hazard
problem is absent) gives the upper bound. The difference between these bounds approaches
zero as the mass of shirking individuals decreases.
15This can be replaced with λ∗ of individuals with types c ≥ αδs participating and the rest staying out,
or any of a continuum of payoff-equivalent equilibria that maintain a mass λ∗ of this group participating in
expectation. So long as the expected mass λ∗ is preserved, which individuals participate and which stay out
is arbitrary (recall that the type of these individuals is irrelevant since they shirk whenever employed).
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Absent the aforementioned condition on F , complete characterization of equilibria is
technically difficult. The reason is that as s increases, there are two opposing effects on the
benefit from participation: (i) the negative effect of more expensive search; (ii) the positive
effect of a higher payoff difference between exerting effort and shirking, leading to a smaller
proportion of shirkers among job seekers, and hence a higher wage. Depending on the shape
of F , these effects may interact nonmonotonically: As s varies, the pooling wage (above
which all types of individuals are willing to participate) may cross the equilibrium wage
multiple times. Hence, pooling equilibria may change to semi-separating equilibria and back
at arbitrary points as s increases.
3.4 Comparative Statics
Now we demonstrate that, in sharp contrast to the benchmark model, a reduction of indi-
viduals’ search cost in the model with moral hazard is welfare damaging for s < β(pi − u0)
and eventually leads to collapse of the labor market.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. As we noted before, a reduction of s to s′
leads to higher incentives for ‘shirkers’ to participate. Thus, in equilibrium, wage goes down
to counterbalance that effect. But all individuals who exert high effort pay the search cost
rarely, while receiving the wage in every period. Thus their utility goes down, so some (who
would have worked with high effort otherwise) leave the market.
As a result, under lower search cost there are fewer workers who exert high effort and
contribute to welfare. The labor market shrinks, total production goes down, and this effect
dominates the benefit of having lower search costs. Eventually, as s continues to go down, the
expected benefit for firms from opening a vacancy becomes lower than the cost of maintaining
the vacancy, thus labor demand drops to zero and the market collapses.
Proposition 2. In the model with moral hazard, individual’s search cost s∗ = β(pi − u0)
maximizes the welfare. Any reduction of the search cost below s∗ is welfare damaging,
moreover, a reduction of the search cost below s leads to a collapse of the labor market.
This proposition is straightforward by Lemma 4 below and Theorem 1, where we use
the result in Part B that for s ≥ β(pi − u0) the equilibrium in the model with moral hazard
coincides with that in the benchmark model.
Lemma 4. For all s ∈ [s, β(pi − u0)] the welfare in the model with moral hazard is equal to
W (s) =
∫ c∗(s)
0
αs− c
1− δ dF (c) +
α(pi − u0 − s)
1− αδ F (c
∗(s)) (5)
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and it is strictly increasing in s.
For all s ∈ (0, s¯) the welfare in the benchmark model is equal to
W (s) =
∫ c¯(s)
0
[β(pi − u0)− s] + αs− c
1− δ dF (c) +
α(1− β)(pi − u0)
1− αδ F (c¯(s)) (6)
and it is strictly decreasing in s.
The proof is deferred to the Appendix.
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Fig. 1: Comparison of the total welfare in the two models
The difference in the welfare between the two models can be clearly seen by comparing
(5) and (6) and is illustrated by Figure 1, where W (s) is plotted as solid line and W (s) as
dashed line.16 The dominant factor that determines the welfare is the mass of individuals who
participate in the labor market and exert high effort. In the benchmark model, the critical
type who is indifferent between participating or not, c¯(s), is determined by comparing the
expected wage, net of the unemployment income, and the expected costs of job search:
c¯(s) = β(pi − u0)− (1− αδ)s.
16The plot is done for the values of parameters α = δ = 0.9, β = 1/2, pi = 10, u0 = sF = 1 and F uniform
on [0, αδβ(pi − u0)].
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It follows that c∗(s) < c¯(s) for all s < s∗ ≡ β(pi − v0). The gap between c∗(s) and c¯(s)
(and consequently, between the quantities of individuals who contribute to production) is at
maximum when s = 0 and decreases as s grows, up to the point s = s∗, where c∗(s) = c¯(s)
and the equilibria in the two models become the same. The gap between the two welfare
values essentially follows the same pattern, with the difference that for s < s another factor
kicks in: the benefits of production are so low that firms are not willing to open vacancies.
So for s < s we have W (s) = 0, as the labor market does not exist. At the other end
of the scale, for s > s∗, the benefits from “shirking and switching jobs” are so low that
every employee is willing to exert high effort. So the two models produce identical equilibria
and identical welfare, W (s) = W (s). As the search cost goes up above s∗, it provides no
additional incentives to exert effort, thus being a pure waste and hence reducing the welfare.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we consider the role of job search costs as an incentive mechanism in the pres-
ence of moral hazard, and we study the effect of policies targeting reduction of job search
friction on social welfare. Without moral hazard, or when job search costs are unnaturally
high, a policy aimed at reducing unemployment and increasing productivity through a re-
duction in job search costs is likely to be successful. However, our results illustrate that
in the presence of moral hazard and when the existing search costs are not very high, such
policies may backfire by removing workers’ incentives to exert effort on the job, leading to
lower productivity, lower wages, and higher unemployment rates.
While unemployment benefits increase unemployment, they were found to increase av-
erage productivity levels (Blanchard, 2004). This has been explained by the fact that un-
employment benefits enable workers to decline current job offers and continue searching for
more productive jobs (e.g., Diamond, 1981; Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000; Marimon and Zili-
botti, 1999) or to negotiate contracts that in turn lead to higher productivity (Demougin
and Helm, 2011). By comparison, in our model unemployment benefits have two contrasting
effects. Unconditional unemployment benefits undermine the incentives to participate in
the job market for the individuals who exert low effort, so that the average productivity of
employed workers increases, but the total output is unaffected (cf. Manning, 2009). Unem-
ployment benefits with eligibility constraints that only affect active job seekers effectively
reduce the job search costs, which according to our analysis, remove the incentives to exert
effort for some proportion of the workers, thus resulting in lower total output.
Unemployment benefits with eligibility constraints are known to affect search intensity
(Baily, 1978), leading to increased frictional unemployment. This adverse effect can be mit-
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igated through an appropriate unemployment insurance schedule and taxation (Shavell and
Weiss, 1979; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997). However, such mechanisms are not conducive
in dealing with the on-the-job moral hazard studied in our model. Thus, extending the
model to allow workers to choose search intensity would not alter our main result.
Some empirical regularities are in line with our qualitative conclusions.17 First, the model
predicts that the workforce is composed of two broad types: workers who exert effort and
remain employed with the same firm long-term and those who “shirk and switch”. Consis-
tent with this view, while most new jobs break down in just over a year, the workforce is
dominated by workers who survive this initial period and remain employed for around ten
years (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2002). Second, our model adds to the possible explanations
behind the decrease in job stability over the last couple of decades (see, e.g., Farber, 2010;
Macaulay, 2003; Gregg and Wadsworth, 2002), concurrent with technological changes that
reduce search costs, e.g., the proliferation of websites such as LinkedIn designed to facilitate
matching. Consistent with transitions to the “shirk and switch” strategy, the decrease in
the median job tenure is more dramatic than the decrease in the average job tenure. For
example, Macaulay (2003) reports a drop of 3.7% in average job tenure compared to a drop
of 21.3% in the median between 1996 and 2001 in the UK.
Nineteen-Ninety-six also marked the Jobseeker’s Allowance reform in the UK, which ef-
fectively reduced relative job search costs. Studying the long-term effects of the JSA reform,
Petrongolo (2009) found that, although the reform was successful in moving workers into
employment, it had an overall negative effect on job tenure after reemployment, again consis-
tent with the “shirk and switch” strategy. Furthermore, the reform had a negative effect on
post-unemployment annual earnings, possibly reflecting the negative effect on productivity
in the labor market predicted by our model. Taken together, these stylized empirical facts,
although far from providing conclusive evidence for the validity of the model, support the
argument that reducing job search costs has a significant effect on workers’ motivation on
the job and on labor market outcomes.
We see a few interesting future extensions to the paper. We incorporate any costs as-
sociated with a lengthy search to the aggregate search costs and do not model explicitly
frictional unemployment in the market as such. Disentangling the different effects could
lead to a more complete assessment of different policies that influence job search costs. An-
other interesting avenue of research would be to include heterogeneous jobs and determine
the effect of job search costs on the composition of jobs offered by firms and accepted by
workers. Heterogeneity of jobs would also permit to model externalities between market
17That is not to say that the process we outline in this paper is the only one contributing to these
regularities.
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participants arising from search frictions and to study the effects of search costs in the pres-
ence of these externalities. Yet another interesting question arises, as in practice job search
sometimes involves obtaining certain qualifications that can be costly and time consuming
but improve productivity or reduce the cost of effort. Jobseeker benefits in the form of tu-
ition subsidies thus have a productivity-improving element. So, the overall welfare impact
becomes ambiguous and is subject to further studies. Finally, a more accurate welfare anal-
ysis requires to assume risk aversion of individuals and a more general form of the matching
function (e.g., Cobb-Douglas).
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. In the model with no moral hazard, a reduction of the job search cost is
welfare improving.
The proof is divided into four subsections.
A.1.1. Labor demand. Denote by x and y the masses of searching individuals and firms,
respectively, and by X and Y the masses of active individuals (that are searching or pro-
ducing) and active firms (that have a filled job or a vacancy), respectively. Let J and V be
a firm’s value of a filled job and a vacancy, respectively. Let µF be the probability to fill a
vacancy in a given period, µF = min{x/y, 1}. Then
V = −sF + µFJ + (1− µF )δV.
Assume that firms create vacancies so long as V > 0 and withdraw them if V < 0. If J < sF ,
then V < 0 for all µF , hence there will be no labor demand, Y = 0. However, if J ≥ sF ,
then in steady state V = 0 must hold, hence µF must satisfy
−sF + µFJ = 0. (A.1)
Since sF/J = µF ≡ min{x/y, 1}, then either sF/J < 1, and hence x/y < 1, or sF/J = 1,
and hence x/y ≥ 1. Moreover, in the latter case it must be x/y = 1, because we have
assumed that firms create vacancies so long as the cost of maintaining one, sF , does not
exceed the expected benefit, J .18 So, if y < x, then new vacancies will be created until
y = x. Consequently, the mass of job searching individuals does not exceed the mass of
vacancies, so every individual finds a job immediately with certainty.19
Let us now derive the mass of active firms, Y . Denote by γ the fraction of individuals
that are employed at the beginning of each period. Then
µF =
x
y
=
X − γX
Y − γX . (A.2)
18The assumption that firms create vacancies whenever indifferent is standard and can be justified, for
example, that creating a vacancy is welfare improving. Note that this assumption has a bite only in the event
of very low expected benefit from hiring an employee, J = sF . The results presented below are unaffected
so long as this low threshold is not reached.
19See the discussion at the bottom of Section 2.
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Combining (A.1) and (A.2) yields
Y = X
(
γ + (1− γ) J
sF
)
. (A.3)
A.1.2. Labor Supply. In the benchmark model there is no moral hazard, so all employees
exert high effort.20 Hence firms will never dismiss workers. The fraction of individuals who
lose their jobs and return to the job market is given by job destruction rate 1−α. The total
revenue created by a filled job position net of the unemployment income (for short, surplus)
is therefore equal to
S = pi − u0 + αδ(pi − u0) + . . . = pi − u0
1− αδ .
Similarly, a firm’s gross value of filling a vacancy is equal to
J =
pi − w
1− αδ .
We assumed that a firm’s share of the surplus is 1−β, so J = (1−β)S, and hence the wage
is given by21
w = u0 + β(pi − u0). (A.4)
Let us now determine the equilibrium behavior of an individual with cost of effort c.
Lemma 5. An individual of type c ∈ R+ participates in the job market if and only if
c < β(pi − u0)− (1− αδ)s.
Proof. Since we are considering equilibria in steady state only, it is sufficient to compare
the lifetime utility of the individual who is always active and the one who is always inactive.
The utility of an inactive individual of type c is given by (3) in the main text, restated here:
U0 = u0 + δU0 =
u0
1− δ . (A.5)
Now consider an active individual of type c. Denote by UH(c) her lifetime utility starting
from a period where she is unemployed (subscript H stands for “high effort” for consistency
20Individuals with type c > w will not exert high effort. But these individuals experience negative utility
from labor, thus staying out of the labor market in equilibrium.
21We assume this simple form of wage determination to keep the analysis straightforward and transparent.
The interpretation is that w is a result of negotiations between firms and the employees union; from the
perspective of an individual, w is exogenous. The results are not qualitatively affected if we model bargaining
as a compromise of the two parties whose disagreement options are endogenously determined in the model.
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with notations in further sections). Note that in the period where she is employed, her
lifetime utility is simply UH(c) + s, as in a steady state the only difference between being
employed and unemployed is the job search cost (as we have established above that individ-
uals find a job immediately with probability one). This yields (1) in the main text, restated
here:
UH(c) = −s+ (w − c) + δ [α(UH(c) + s) + (1− α)UH(c)]
=
w − c− (1− αδ)s
1− δ . (A.6)
Consequently, an individual of type c will participate in the labor market if and only if22
UH(c) > U0, or
c < w − u0 − (1− αδ)s,
which, together with (A.4), yields the result.
Intuitively, an individual will participate in the labor market if her cost of effort is small
relative to the expected wage, net of the unemployment income and expected costs of job
search. Denote by c¯(s) the critical type who is indifferent between participating or not,
c¯(s) = β(pi − u0)− (1− αδ)s.
A.1.3. Steady State. We are now in position to find the masses of active individuals
and active firms, X and Y , in steady state.
First, by Lemma 6, only individuals of type c < c¯(s) will be active, hence
X = F (c¯(s)).
Next, a firm’s value of a filled job is given by
J = (1− β)S = (1− β)(pi − u0)
1− αδ .
Finally, after every period fraction α of active individuals remain employed, thus γ = α.
Consequently, by (A.3),
Y = F (c¯(s))
(
α + (1− α)(1− β)(pi − u0)
sF (1− αδ)
)
.
Note that if the individuals’ search cost is high enough, s ≥ β(pi − u0)/(1 − αδ), then
22The tie is a zero probability event and thus can be ignored.
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no individuals participate and the labor market collapses (since in that case c¯(s) ≤ 0 and
F (c¯(s)) = 0, so we have X = 0). Similarly, if the firms’ advertising cost is high enough,
sF > J = (1 − β)(pi − u0)/(1 − αδ), no firms are willing to open vacancies, so we have
Y = 0 and the labor market collapses. For the rest of the paper we assume that sF ≤
(1− β)(pi − u0)/(1− αδ).
A.1.4. Comparative Statics. Let us analyze the relationship between an individual’s
job search cost and the welfare. As in this model search cost s represents a pure waste, it is
very intuitive that a reduction of s leads to welfare improvement.
Indeed, consider a reduction of the search cost from s to s′. Then the mass of the
individuals who search for jobs weakly increases, as s > s′ entails c¯(s) < c¯(s′), and conse-
quently F (c¯(s)) ≤ F (c¯(s′)). Any individual who is participating under s′ is strictly better off
relative to s, as her utility has gone up due to the lower search cost. Any individual who is
inactive under s′ is indifferent between s and s′, as her utility remains unchanged, u0/(1−δ).
Hence, the consumer surplus strictly increases as s goes down.
Next, firms with filled job positions make profit (1−β)(pi−u0) in a single period. Under s′
the mass of firms engaged in production is larger, and so is the total producers’ surplus.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1.
(A) There exists an equilibrium with positive participation if and only if s ≤ s < s¯.
(B) The equilibrium with positive participation is unique. If s ≥ β(pi−u0), then it coincides
with that in the benchmark model. If s ≤ β(pi − u0),23 then it is characterized by:
(i) the equilibrium wage is w = u0 + s;
(ii) every individual of type c < αδs participates with probability one and exerts high
effort; every individual of type c ≥ αδs participates with probability λ∗ and exerts low effort,24
where
λ∗ =
(1− α)F (αδs)
(1− αδ)(1− F (αδs)) ·
β(pi − u0)− s
βu0 + s
. (4)
A.2.1. Part (B). We will prove that if there exists an equilibrium with positive partici-
pation, then it is unique and satisfies the conditions stated in Part B.
23For s = β(pi − u0) both statements are true.
24This can be replaced with λ∗ of individuals with types c ≥ αδs participating and the rest staying out,
or any of a continuum of payoff-equivalent equilibria that maintain a mass λ∗ of this group participating in
expectation. So long as the expected mass λ∗ is preserved, which individuals participate and which stay out
is arbitrary (recall that the type of these individuals is irrelevant since they shirk whenever employed).
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Recall that we focus on stationary equilibria. In particular, the best reply of a firm
to a stationary strategy of the individuals (Lemma 1) and the best reply of individuals
to a stationary strategy of firms (Theorem 1) are stationary. In other words, no market
participants can benefit by deviating to nonstationary strategies.
Denote by p the probability that a newly hired worker has type c < c∗(s) and thus will
exert high effort when employed. Then, surplus S produced by a filled job vacancy is given
by
S = p
pi − u0
1− αδ + (1− p)(−u0), (A.7)
where (pi−u0)/(1−αδ) is the surplus from an employee who always exerts high effort (as S
in Section 3) and (−u0) is the surplus from an employee who shirks in the first period and
loses the job at the end of that period.
Similarly, the value J of a filled job vacancy for a firm is given by
J = p
pi − w
1− αδ + (1− p)(−w) = S − p(λ)
w − u0
1− αδ − (1− p)(w − u0),
where w is the equilibrium wage. Recall that wage determination rule requires
J = (1− β)S. (A.8)
As J is strictly decreasing in w and J = S for w = u0, for any given p there exists a unique
w that solves (A.8).
Suppose that s > β(pi − u0). By the wage determination rule, the wage cannot exceed
its feasible maximum u0 + β(pi − u0), hence w < u0 + s. This corresponds to case (a) in
Corollary 1, where all individuals who participate exert high effort, p = 1. Then we have
S = (pi−u0)/(1−αδ) and J = (pi−w)/(1−αδ). Solving (A.8) for w yields w = u0+β(pi−u0).
Note that this is the same equilibrium as in the benchmark model.
Next, suppose that s < β(pi − u0). Corollary 1 implies the following labor market
composition. The total mass of active individuals with type c < c∗(s) is F (c∗(s)), of which
only fraction 1 − α lose their jobs and return to the labor market. Hence the mass of
individuals with type c < c∗(s) on the labor market constitutes (1 − α)F (c∗(s)). Next, the
total mass of individuals with type c ≥ c∗(s) is 1−F (c∗(s)), of which some fraction λ ∈ [0, 1]
are active. Hence the mass of individuals with type c ≥ c∗(s) on the labor market constitutes
λ(1−F (c∗(s))). Consequently, the probability that a newly hired worker has type c < c∗(s)
and thus will exert high effort is given by
p = p(λ) =
(1− α)F (c∗(s))
(1− α)F (c∗(s)) + λ(1− F (c∗(s))) =
(
1 + λ
1− F (c∗(s))
(1− α)F (c∗(s))
)−1
(A.9)
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Consider case (c) in Corollary 1 that stipulates w = u0 + s, so condition (i) holds. Then
there is a unique value of λ that solves (A.8) and it is equal to λ∗ that can be easily verified.
Thus we have proved that the equilibrium must satisfy condition (ii). Yet we need to verify
that λ∗ ∈ [0, 1]. We have assumed that s ≤ β(pi − u0), thus λ∗ ≥ 0. Also we have assumed
that F first order stochastically dominates the uniform distribution on [0, αδβ(pi− u0)], i.e.,
F (c∗(s)) ≤ c
∗(s)
αδβ(pi − u0) =
αδs
αδβ(pi − u0) =
s
β(pi − u0) (A.10)
for all s ∈ [0, β(pi − u0]. Hence we have F (c∗(s))β(pi − u0) ≤ s for all s ∈ [0, β(pi − u0)].
Consequently,
λ∗ =
(1− α)F (αδs)
(1− αδ)(1− F (αδs)) ·
β(pi − u0)− s
βu0 + s
≤ (1− α)s
β(1− αδ) + s ≤ 1.
Next, let us show that cases (a) and (b) in Corollary 1 cannot occur in equilibrium. It
was shown above that case (a) entails s > β(pi− u0), a contradiction. It remains to consider
case (b) that stipulates w > u0 + s and λ = 1. Then we have
p = p(1) =
(1− α)F (c∗(s))
1− αF (c∗(s)) .
Equation (A.8) can be rewritten as
p
w − u0
1− αδ + (1− p)(w − u0) = β
(
p
pi − u0
1− αδ + (1− p)(−u0)
)
.
Solving for (w − u0) we obtain
w − u0 = pβ(pi − u0)
1− αδ(1− p) −
(1− αδ)(1− p)u0
1− αδ(1− p)
≤ p β(pi − u0)
1− αδ(1− p) =
(1− α)F (c∗(s))
1− αF (c∗(s)) ·
β(pi − u0)
1− αδ(1− p)
≤ (1− α)s
(1− αF (c∗(s)))(1− αδ(1− p))
≤ s,
where the third line is by (A.10) and the last line is due to:
1− αδ(1− p) = 1− αδ 1− F (c
∗(s))
1− αF (c∗(s)) =
1− α(δ + (1− δ)F (c∗(s)))
1− αF (c∗(s)) ≥
1− α
1− αF (c∗(s)) .
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But we have assumed w > u0 + s, a contradiction.
A.2.2. Part (A). First, we show that X = 0 for s ≥ s¯. For s > β(pi−u0), the equilibrium
(if it exists) is the same as in the benchmark model, and by Lemma 6, an individual of
type c participates in the labor market if and only if c < c¯(s). But for s ≥ s¯, c¯(s) =
β(pi − v0)− (1− αδ)s ≤ 0, hence there is no participation, X = 0.
Second, we show that Y = 0 for s < s. Recall that in equilibrium Y > 0 only if J ≥ sF ,
where
J = (1− β)S = (1− β)
(
p
pi − u0
1− αδ − (1− p)u0
)
.
Substituting the value of λ∗ into (A.9), after some manipulations, yields
p = p(λ∗) =
(1− αδ)(βu0 + s)
β(pi − αδu0)− αδs.
Next, substituting p(λ∗) into the expression for J , after some manipulations, yields
J =
(1− β)pis
β(pi − αδu0)− αδs. (A.11)
At last, solving inequality J ≥ sF for s yields
s ≥ β(pi − αδu0)sF
(1− β)pi + αδsF ≡ s.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. For all s ∈ [s, β(pi − u0)] the welfare in the model with moral hazard is equal to
W (s) =
∫ c∗(s)
0
αs− c
1− δ dF (c) +
α(pi − u0 − s)
1− αδ F (c
∗(s)) (5)
and it is strictly increasing in s.
For all s ∈ (0, s¯) the welfare in the benchmark model is equal to
W (s) =
∫ c¯(s)
0
[β(pi − u0)− s] + αs− c
1− δ dF (c) +
α(1− β)(pi − u0)
1− αδ F (c¯(s)) (6)
and it is strictly decreasing in s.
Let us calculate the welfare in the benchmark model first. In every period an individual
of type c < c¯(s) ≡ β(pi − v0) − (1 − αδ)s obtains w − c. Also, with probability 1 − α she
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is unemployed at the beginning of the period, so she pays search cost s. Thus the lifetime
utility of an individual of type c < c¯(s) is equal to
w − c− (1− α)s
1− δ =
u0 + β(pi − u0)− c− (1− α)s
1− δ ,
where we used that in equilibrium the wage satisfies w = u0 + β(pi − u0). The lifetime
utility of an individual of type c ≥ c¯(s) is the unemployment income, u0/(1− δ). Hence, the
consumer’s surplus (net of the unemployment income) is equal to
CS(s) =
∫ c¯(s)
0
β(pi − u0)− (1− α)s− c
1− δ dF (c).
Next, at the beginning of the period, the mass of firms who have a filled position is αF (c¯(s)).
The lifetime utility of any such firm is (pi−w)/(1−αδ). Any firm that has an unfilled vacancy
or inactive has zero lifetime utility. Hence the producers’ surplus is equal to
PS(s) = αF (c¯(s))
pi − w
1− αδ = αF (c¯(s))
pi − (u0 + β(pi − u0))
1− αδ
= αF (c¯(s))
(1− β)(pi − u0)
1− αδ .
Summing up CS(s) and PS(s) gives the expression for welfare W (s). As c¯(s) is strictly
decreasing in s, it is easy to verify that CS(s) is strictly decreasing and PS(s) is decreasing.
Hence W (s) is strictly decreasing.
Let us now calculate the welfare in the model with moral hazard. In every period an
individual of type c < c∗(s) ≡ αδs obtains w− c and also pays search cost s with probability
1− α that she has become unemployed at the end of the previous period. Thus the lifetime
utility of an individual of type c < c∗(s) ≡ αδs is equal to
w − c− (1− α)s
1− δ =
(u0 + s)− c− (1− α)s
1− δ =
u0 + αs− c
1− δ ,
where we used that in equilibrium the wage satisfies w = u0 + s. The lifetime utility of an
individual of type c ≥ c∗(s) is the unemployment income, u0/(1− δ). Hence, the consumer’s
surplus (net of the unemployment income) is equal to
CS(s) =
∫ c∗(s)
0
αs− c
1− δ dF (c).
Next, similarly to in the benchmark model, at the beginning of the period, the mass of firms
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who have a filled position is αF (c∗(s)). The lifetime utility of any such firm is (pi−w)/(1−
αδ). Any firm that has an unfilled vacancy or inactive has zero lifetime utility. Hence the
producers’ surplus is equal to
PS(s) = αF (c∗(s))
pi − w
1− αδ = αF (c
∗(s))
pi − (u0 + s)
1− αδ .
Summing up CS(s) and PS(s) gives the expression for welfare W (s). Taking the derivative
of W (s) (where we have used dc∗(s)/ds = αδ) yields
d
ds
W (s) =
α
1− δF (c
∗(s)) + αδf(c∗(s)) +
α2δ
1− αδf(c
∗(s))(pi − u0 − s)− α
1− αδF (c
∗(s))
=
α2δ
1− αδf(c
∗(s))(pi − u0 − s) + αδf(c∗(s)) + αF (c∗(s))
(
1
1− δ −
1
1− αδ
)
> 0,
since by assumption s ≤ β(pi − u0) < pi − u0 and 11−δ − 11−αδ > 0.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. In the model with no moral hazard, a reduction of the job search cost is
welfare improving.
The proof is divided into four subsections.
A.1.1. Labor demand. Denote by x and y the masses of searching individuals and firms,
respectively, and by X and Y the masses of active individuals (that are searching or pro-
ducing) and active firms (that have a filled job or a vacancy), respectively. Let J and V be
a firm’s value of a filled job and a vacancy, respectively. Let µF be the probability to fill a
vacancy in a given period, µF = min{x/y, 1}. Then
V = −sF + µFJ + (1− µF )δV.
Assume that firms create vacancies so long as V > 0 and withdraw them if V < 0. If J < sF ,
then V < 0 for all µF , hence there will be no labor demand, Y = 0. However, if J ≥ sF ,
then in steady state V = 0 must hold, hence µF must satisfy
−sF + µFJ = 0. (A.1)
Since sF/J = µF ≡ min{x/y, 1}, then either sF/J < 1, and hence x/y < 1, or sF/J = 1,
and hence x/y ≥ 1. Moreover, in the latter case it must be x/y = 1, because we have
assumed that firms create vacancies so long as the cost of maintaining one, sF , does not
exceed the expected benefit, J .25 So, if y < x, then new vacancies will be created until
y = x. Consequently, the mass of job searching individuals does not exceed the mass of
vacancies, so every individual finds a job immediately with certainty.26
Let us now derive the mass of active firms, Y . Denote by γ the fraction of individuals
that are employed at the beginning of each period. Then
µF =
x
y
=
X − γX
Y − γX . (A.2)
25The assumption that firms create vacancies whenever indifferent is standard and can be justified, for
example, that creating a vacancy is welfare improving. Note that this assumption has a bite only in the event
of very low expected benefit from hiring an employee, J = sF . The results presented below are unaffected
so long as this low threshold is not reached.
26See the discussion at the bottom of Section 2.
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Combining (A.1) and (A.2) yields
Y = X
(
γ + (1− γ) J
sF
)
. (A.3)
A.1.2. Labor Supply. In the benchmark model there is no moral hazard, so all employees
exert high effort.27 Hence firms will never dismiss workers. The fraction of individuals who
lose their jobs and return to the job market is given by job destruction rate 1−α. The total
revenue created by a filled job position net of the unemployment income (for short, surplus)
is therefore equal to
S = pi − u0 + αδ(pi − u0) + . . . = pi − u0
1− αδ .
Similarly, a firm’s gross value of filling a vacancy is equal to
J =
pi − w
1− αδ .
We assumed that a firm’s share of the surplus is 1−β, so J = (1−β)S, and hence the wage
is given by28
w = u0 + β(pi − u0). (A.4)
Let us now determine the equilibrium behavior of an individual with cost of effort c.
Lemma 6. An individual of type c ∈ R+ participates in the job market if and only if
c < β(pi − u0)− (1− αδ)s.
Proof. Since we are considering equilibria in steady state only, it is sufficient to compare
the lifetime utility of the individual who is always active and the one who is always inactive.
The utility of an inactive individual of type c is given by (3) in the main text, restated here:
U0 = u0 + δU0 =
u0
1− δ . (A.5)
Now consider an active individual of type c. Denote by UH(c) her lifetime utility starting
from a period where she is unemployed (subscript H stands for “high effort” for consistency
27Individuals with type c > w will not exert high effort. But these individuals experience negative utility
from labor, thus staying out of the labor market in equilibrium.
28We assume this simple form of wage determination to keep the analysis straightforward and transparent.
The interpretation is that w is a result of negotiations between firms and the employees union; from the
perspective of an individual, w is exogenous. The results are not qualitatively affected if we model bargaining
as a compromise of the two parties whose disagreement options are endogenously determined in the model.
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with notations in further sections). Note that in the period where she is employed, her
lifetime utility is simply UH(c) + s, as in a steady state the only difference between being
employed and unemployed is the job search cost (as we have established above that individ-
uals find a job immediately with probability one). This yields (1) in the main text, restated
here:
UH(c) = −s+ (w − c) + δ [α(UH(c) + s) + (1− α)UH(c)]
=
w − c− (1− αδ)s
1− δ . (A.6)
Consequently, an individual of type c will participate in the labor market if and only if29
UH(c) > U0, or
c < w − u0 − (1− αδ)s,
which, together with (A.4), yields the result.
Intuitively, an individual will participate in the labor market if her cost of effort is small
relative to the expected wage, net of the unemployment income and expected costs of job
search. Denote by c¯(s) the critical type who is indifferent between participating or not,
c¯(s) = β(pi − u0)− (1− αδ)s.
A.1.3. Steady State. We are now in position to find the masses of active individuals
and active firms, X and Y , in steady state.
First, by Lemma 6, only individuals of type c < c¯(s) will be active, hence
X = F (c¯(s)).
Next, a firm’s value of a filled job is given by
J = (1− β)S = (1− β)(pi − u0)
1− αδ .
Finally, after every period fraction α of active individuals remain employed, thus γ = α.
Consequently, by (A.3),
Y = F (c¯(s))
(
α + (1− α)(1− β)(pi − u0)
sF (1− αδ)
)
.
Note that if the individuals’ search cost is high enough, s ≥ β(pi − u0)/(1 − αδ), then
29The tie is a zero probability event and thus can be ignored.
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no individuals participate and the labor market collapses (since in that case c¯(s) ≤ 0 and
F (c¯(s)) = 0, so we have X = 0). Similarly, if the firms’ advertising cost is high enough,
sF > J = (1 − β)(pi − u0)/(1 − αδ), no firms are willing to open vacancies, so we have
Y = 0 and the labor market collapses. For the rest of the paper we assume that sF ≤
(1− β)(pi − u0)/(1− αδ).
A.1.4. Comparative Statics. Let us analyze the relationship between an individual’s
job search cost and the welfare. As in this model search cost s represents a pure waste, it is
very intuitive that a reduction of s leads to welfare improvement.
Indeed, consider a reduction of the search cost from s to s′. Then the mass of the
individuals who search for jobs weakly increases, as s > s′ entails c¯(s) < c¯(s′), and conse-
quently F (c¯(s)) ≤ F (c¯(s′)). Any individual who is participating under s′ is strictly better off
relative to s, as her utility has gone up due to the lower search cost. Any individual who is
inactive under s′ is indifferent between s and s′, as her utility remains unchanged, u0/(1−δ).
Hence, the consumer surplus strictly increases as s goes down.
Next, firms with filled job positions make profit (1−β)(pi−u0) in a single period. Under s′
the mass of firms engaged in production is larger, and so is the total producers’ surplus.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1.
(A) There exists an equilibrium with positive participation if and only if s ≤ s < s¯.
(B) The equilibrium with positive participation is unique. If s ≥ β(pi−u0), then it coincides
with that in the benchmark model. If s ≤ β(pi − u0),30 then it is characterized by:
(i) the equilibrium wage is w = u0 + s;
(ii) every individual of type c < αδs participates with probability one and exerts high
effort; every individual of type c ≥ αδs participates with probability λ∗ and exerts low effort,31
where
λ∗ =
(1− α)F (αδs)
(1− αδ)(1− F (αδs)) ·
β(pi − u0)− s
βu0 + s
. (4)
A.2.1. Part (B). We will prove that if there exists an equilibrium with positive partici-
pation, then it is unique and satisfies the conditions stated in Part B.
30For s = β(pi − u0) both statements are true.
31This can be replaced with λ∗ of individuals with types c ≥ αδs participating and the rest staying out,
or any of a continuum of payoff-equivalent equilibria that maintain a mass λ∗ of this group participating in
expectation. So long as the expected mass λ∗ is preserved, which individuals participate and which stay out
is arbitrary (recall that the type of these individuals is irrelevant since they shirk whenever employed).
30
Recall that we focus on stationary equilibria. In particular, the best reply of a firm
to a stationary strategy of the individuals (Lemma 1) and the best reply of individuals
to a stationary strategy of firms (Theorem 1) are stationary. In other words, no market
participants can benefit by deviating to nonstationary strategies.
Denote by p the probability that a newly hired worker has type c < c∗(s) and thus will
exert high effort when employed. Then, surplus S produced by a filled job vacancy is given
by
S = p
pi − u0
1− αδ + (1− p)(−u0), (A.7)
where (pi−u0)/(1−αδ) is the surplus from an employee who always exerts high effort (as S
in Section 3) and (−u0) is the surplus from an employee who shirks in the first period and
loses the job at the end of that period.
Similarly, the value J of a filled job vacancy for a firm is given by
J = p
pi − w
1− αδ + (1− p)(−w) = S − p(λ)
w − u0
1− αδ − (1− p)(w − u0),
where w is the equilibrium wage. Recall that wage determination rule requires
J = (1− β)S. (A.8)
As J is strictly decreasing in w and J = S for w = u0, for any given p there exists a unique
w that solves (A.8).
Suppose that s > β(pi − u0). By the wage determination rule, the wage cannot exceed
its feasible maximum u0 + β(pi − u0), hence w < u0 + s. This corresponds to case (a) in
Corollary 1, where all individuals who participate exert high effort, p = 1. Then we have
S = (pi−u0)/(1−αδ) and J = (pi−w)/(1−αδ). Solving (A.8) for w yields w = u0+β(pi−u0).
Note that this is the same equilibrium as in the benchmark model.
Next, suppose that s < β(pi − u0). Corollary 1 implies the following labor market
composition. The total mass of active individuals with type c < c∗(s) is F (c∗(s)), of which
only fraction 1 − α lose their jobs and return to the labor market. Hence the mass of
individuals with type c < c∗(s) on the labor market constitutes (1 − α)F (c∗(s)). Next, the
total mass of individuals with type c ≥ c∗(s) is 1−F (c∗(s)), of which some fraction λ ∈ [0, 1]
are active. Hence the mass of individuals with type c ≥ c∗(s) on the labor market constitutes
λ(1−F (c∗(s))). Consequently, the probability that a newly hired worker has type c < c∗(s)
and thus will exert high effort is given by
p = p(λ) =
(1− α)F (c∗(s))
(1− α)F (c∗(s)) + λ(1− F (c∗(s))) =
(
1 + λ
1− F (c∗(s))
(1− α)F (c∗(s))
)−1
(A.9)
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Consider case (c) in Corollary 1 that stipulates w = u0 + s, so condition (i) holds. Then
there is a unique value of λ that solves (A.8) and it is equal to λ∗ that can be easily verified.
Thus we have proved that the equilibrium must satisfy condition (ii). Yet we need to verify
that λ∗ ∈ [0, 1]. We have assumed that s ≤ β(pi − u0), thus λ∗ ≥ 0. Also we have assumed
that F first order stochastically dominates the uniform distribution on [0, αδβ(pi− u0)], i.e.,
F (c∗(s)) ≤ c
∗(s)
αδβ(pi − u0) =
αδs
αδβ(pi − u0) =
s
β(pi − u0) (A.10)
for all s ∈ [0, β(pi − u0]. Hence we have F (c∗(s))β(pi − u0) ≤ s for all s ∈ [0, β(pi − u0)].
Consequently,
λ∗ =
(1− α)F (αδs)
(1− αδ)(1− F (αδs)) ·
β(pi − u0)− s
βu0 + s
≤ (1− α)s
β(1− αδ) + s ≤ 1.
Next, let us show that cases (a) and (b) in Corollary 1 cannot occur in equilibrium. It
was shown above that case (a) entails s > β(pi− u0), a contradiction. It remains to consider
case (b) that stipulates w > u0 + s and λ = 1. Then we have
p = p(1) =
(1− α)F (c∗(s))
1− αF (c∗(s)) .
Equation (A.8) can be rewritten as
p
w − u0
1− αδ + (1− p)(w − u0) = β
(
p
pi − u0
1− αδ + (1− p)(−u0)
)
.
Solving for (w − u0) we obtain
w − u0 = pβ(pi − u0)
1− αδ(1− p) −
(1− αδ)(1− p)u0
1− αδ(1− p)
≤ p β(pi − u0)
1− αδ(1− p) =
(1− α)F (c∗(s))
1− αF (c∗(s)) ·
β(pi − u0)
1− αδ(1− p)
≤ (1− α)s
(1− αF (c∗(s)))(1− αδ(1− p))
≤ s,
where the third line is by (A.10) and the last line is due to:
1− αδ(1− p) = 1− αδ 1− F (c
∗(s))
1− αF (c∗(s)) =
1− α(δ + (1− δ)F (c∗(s)))
1− αF (c∗(s)) ≥
1− α
1− αF (c∗(s)) .
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But we have assumed w > u0 + s, a contradiction.
A.2.2. Part (A). First, we show that X = 0 for s ≥ s¯. For s > β(pi−u0), the equilibrium
(if it exists) is the same as in the benchmark model, and by Lemma 6, an individual of
type c participates in the labor market if and only if c < c¯(s). But for s ≥ s¯, c¯(s) =
β(pi − v0)− (1− αδ)s ≤ 0, hence there is no participation, X = 0.
Second, we show that Y = 0 for s < s. Recall that in equilibrium Y > 0 only if J ≥ sF ,
where
J = (1− β)S = (1− β)
(
p
pi − u0
1− αδ − (1− p)u0
)
.
Substituting the value of λ∗ into (A.9), after some manipulations, yields
p = p(λ∗) =
(1− αδ)(βu0 + s)
β(pi − αδu0)− αδs.
Next, substituting p(λ∗) into the expression for J , after some manipulations, yields
J =
(1− β)pis
β(pi − αδu0)− αδs. (A.11)
At last, solving inequality J ≥ sF for s yields
s ≥ β(pi − αδu0)sF
(1− β)pi + αδsF ≡ s.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. For all s ∈ [s, β(pi − u0)] the welfare in the model with moral hazard is equal to
W (s) =
∫ c∗(s)
0
αs− c
1− δ dF (c) +
α(pi − u0 − s)
1− αδ F (c
∗(s)) (5)
and it is strictly increasing in s.
For all s ∈ (0, s¯) the welfare in the benchmark model is equal to
W (s) =
∫ c¯(s)
0
[β(pi − u0)− s] + αs− c
1− δ dF (c) +
α(1− β)(pi − u0)
1− αδ F (c¯(s)) (6)
and it is strictly decreasing in s.
Let us calculate the welfare in the benchmark model first. In every period an individual
of type c < c¯(s) ≡ β(pi − v0) − (1 − αδ)s obtains w − c. Also, with probability 1 − α she
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is unemployed at the beginning of the period, so she pays search cost s. Thus the lifetime
utility of an individual of type c < c¯(s) is equal to
w − c− (1− α)s
1− δ =
u0 + β(pi − u0)− c− (1− α)s
1− δ ,
where we used that in equilibrium the wage satisfies w = u0 + β(pi − u0). The lifetime
utility of an individual of type c ≥ c¯(s) is the unemployment income, u0/(1− δ). Hence, the
consumer’s surplus (net of the unemployment income) is equal to
CS(s) =
∫ c¯(s)
0
β(pi − u0)− (1− α)s− c
1− δ dF (c).
Next, at the beginning of the period, the mass of firms who have a filled position is αF (c¯(s)).
The lifetime utility of any such firm is (pi−w)/(1−αδ). Any firm that has an unfilled vacancy
or inactive has zero lifetime utility. Hence the producers’ surplus is equal to
PS(s) = αF (c¯(s))
pi − w
1− αδ = αF (c¯(s))
pi − (u0 + β(pi − u0))
1− αδ
= αF (c¯(s))
(1− β)(pi − u0)
1− αδ .
Summing up CS(s) and PS(s) gives the expression for welfare W (s). As c¯(s) is strictly
decreasing in s, it is easy to verify that CS(s) is strictly decreasing and PS(s) is decreasing.
Hence W (s) is strictly decreasing.
Let us now calculate the welfare in the model with moral hazard. In every period an
individual of type c < c∗(s) ≡ αδs obtains w− c and also pays search cost s with probability
1− α that she has become unemployed at the end of the previous period. Thus the lifetime
utility of an individual of type c < c∗(s) ≡ αδs is equal to
w − c− (1− α)s
1− δ =
(u0 + s)− c− (1− α)s
1− δ =
u0 + αs− c
1− δ ,
where we used that in equilibrium the wage satisfies w = u0 + s. The lifetime utility of an
individual of type c ≥ c∗(s) is the unemployment income, u0/(1− δ). Hence, the consumer’s
surplus (net of the unemployment income) is equal to
CS(s) =
∫ c∗(s)
0
αs− c
1− δ dF (c).
Next, similarly to in the benchmark model, at the beginning of the period, the mass of firms
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who have a filled position is αF (c∗(s)). The lifetime utility of any such firm is (pi−w)/(1−
αδ). Any firm that has an unfilled vacancy or inactive has zero lifetime utility. Hence the
producers’ surplus is equal to
PS(s) = αF (c∗(s))
pi − w
1− αδ = αF (c
∗(s))
pi − (u0 + s)
1− αδ .
Summing up CS(s) and PS(s) gives the expression for welfare W (s). Taking the derivative
of W (s) (where we have used dc∗(s)/ds = αδ) yields
d
ds
W (s) =
α
1− δF (c
∗(s)) + αδf(c∗(s)) +
α2δ
1− αδf(c
∗(s))(pi − u0 − s)− α
1− αδF (c
∗(s))
=
α2δ
1− αδf(c
∗(s))(pi − u0 − s) + αδf(c∗(s)) + αF (c∗(s))
(
1
1− δ −
1
1− αδ
)
> 0,
since by assumption s ≤ β(pi − u0) < pi − u0 and 11−δ − 11−αδ > 0.
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